Source: European Parliament
B10‑0326/2025
European Parliament resolution on tackling China’s critical raw materials export restrictions
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020[1] (Critical Raw Materials Act),
– having regard to the strategic partnerships on raw materials signed by the EU with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Norway, Rwanda, Serbia, Ukraine and Zambia,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[2],
– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on Shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims[3],
– having regard to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025,
– having regard to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No176) of 1995,
– having regard to the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No 169) of 1989,
– having regard to the statements by Commission President von der Leyen at the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta from 16 to 17 June 2025,
– having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas critical raw materials are essential for the EU’s technological and green transition goals, playing a vital role in industries such as renewable energy, electronics and electric vehicles;
B. whereas the International Energy Agency estimates that China accounts for approximately 61 % of rare earth production and 92 % of their processing;
C. whereas the EU depends on China for over 90 % of its supply of rare earths; whereas any meaningful reduction in this dependency might take three to four years;
D. whereas China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching EUR 739 billion in 2023; whereas the European Union’s stated goal of de-risking from China has led to a number of adjustments in European economic governance;
E. whereas on 4 April 2025, in response to US President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued Announcement 18, imposing export restrictions on seven of the 17 rare earth elements, permanent magnets, and other finished products;
F. whereas these export restrictions affect global supply chains and demonstrate China’s ability to leverage its dominance in critical mineral processing;
G. whereas the number of export restrictions on industrial raw materials globally increased more than fivefold between 2009 and 2023; whereas China accounted for 21 % of new export restrictions in 2023;
H. whereas the EU has formally challenged China at the World Trade Organization regarding its export restrictions on rare earth elements and other critical raw materials;
I. whereas the EU has introduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and has decided to exclude Chinese companies from EU government purchases of medical devices valued at over EUR 5 million; whereas China introduced anti-dumping tariffs on brandy imports from the EU;
J. whereas China’s Commerce Ministry has undertaken to speed up the approval of rare earth export licences for EU firms;
K. whereas an EU-China summit will take place in China in July, marking 50 years of bilateral diplomatic relations;
L. whereas the EU consumes 25-30 % of the metals produced globally and its consumption levels are significantly higher than in Latin America, Asia and Africa;
M. whereas the EU itself has acknowledged that export restrictions can be justified for development objectives, environmental protection, or to ensure the sustainable exploitation of natural resources;
N. whereas many developing countries have successfully used such policies, as seen in Kenya’s leather industry, which benefited from a 40 % export duty on raw hides and skins, creating thousands of jobs and boosting incomes;
O. whereas the current high dependence of the EU on external sources for critical raw materials is largely a result of the EU’s own lack of strategic foresight and an unsustainable consumption model, rather than solely the actions of other countries;
P. whereas the pursuit of critical raw materials for the green transition must not replicate historical patterns of ‘green colonialism’ or ‘new resource grabs’ that disproportionately impact the Global South;
Q. whereas the current EU approach, often driven by European businesses seeking cheap access to raw materials, risks hindering the economic prospects of developing countries by reinforcing their dependence on unprocessed raw material exports and limiting their policy space for industrialisation;
R. whereas the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act designates strategic projects to increase EU capacity to extract, process and recycle strategic raw materials and diversify EU supplies from non-EU countries;
S. whereas existing EU trade agreements and strategic partnerships on raw materials often lack sufficient binding commitments to ensure high environmental, social and governance standards, and have not yet proven effective in fostering genuine value addition or green industrialisation in partner countries;
T. whereas the reliance on voluntary schemes for corporate social and environmental responsibility has proven insufficient to guarantee respect for human rights and environmental protection;
U. whereas foreign direct investment in raw materials sectors has a poor track record, often leading to low revenues for host governments, limited technology transfer, human rights abuses and the displacement of communities;
V. whereas trade agreements, such as the EU-Chile free trade agreement, have been criticised for limiting partner countries’ ability to secure domestic supplies of critical minerals and to implement policies that foster local industrial development;
W. whereas a truly just energy transition requires a fundamental shift in the EU’s approach to raw materials, prioritising reduced consumption, increased circularity and equitable partnerships that benefit all parties and the planet;
1. Calls for the EU and China to use the upcoming summit as an opportunity to ease trade tensions and to jointly revive multilateralism by advocating global trade rules, guided by the principles of solidarity, cooperation, sustainability and democracy;
2. Insists that the EU must not follow the Trump administration’s calls to confront China or to decouple its supply chains from it;
3. Recalls that export restrictions can be a legitimate policy tool for sovereign states to ensure the sustainable management of their natural resources, promote domestic processing, generate revenue, and protect their environment;
4. Rejects rivalry and bloc-building, which risk empowering authoritarian and ultranationalist forces, heightening geopolitical tensions and increasing competition for critical raw materials;
5. Rejects current trade agreements as the primary solution for securing raw materials, as they reinforce neo-extractivism and lock developing countries into the role of raw materials exporters;
6. Highlights that EU trade agreements, by pushing for liberalisation and restricting export taxes or dual-pricing policies, limit developing countries’ policy space to pursue their own industrialisation and value addition strategies; insists that any new agreements explicitly support value addition in partner countries, prioritising processing and recycling projects over extractive ones, and that they include incentives for domestic procurement and local processing of mined critical raw materials;
7. Asserts that the EU’s historical approach, driven by business interests seeking cheap access to raw materials, has contributed to a ‘race to the bottom’ rather than fostering sustainable development; calls for the EU to develop a new type of sustainable trade and investment agreement for the clean transition that sets a ‘new gold standard’ by securing enforceable labour and environmental commitments, effective regulatory cooperation, and strong financing capacity to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes;
8. Emphasises that trade agreements and strategic partnerships should facilitate, not hinder, the global circular economy by promoting international cooperation to establish a global market for secondary raw materials, including reviewing existing trade rules and waste directives to support this objective;
9. Calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the EU’s consumption patterns and a strong commitment to more sufficiency; insists that reducing the EU’s overall consumption of minerals and shifting towards a low-resource economic model must be at the heart of its raw materials strategy;
10. Proposes a binding target to reduce Europe’s demand for primary raw materials by at least 10 % by 2030, by promoting efficiency, circularity and avoidance of use; demands that industrialised countries like the EU bear the main responsibility for reducing their consumption of raw materials;
11. Demands significant investment in, and prioritisation of, circular economy principles domestically; calls for greater EU investment in research and innovation to develop new materials, enable substitution, and improve the recycling and reuse of critical raw materials;
12. Calls for the promotion of a fair, industrialised circular economy at EU level, with clear eco-design standards to ensure that products are fit for reuse, repair and recycling;
13. Emphasises the need to create new economic and business models that support the growth of recycling activities, recognising their potential for job creation;
14. Insists on a review of the current export of waste outside Europe to ensure full implementation of the circular economy and secondary raw material production within the EU;
15. Insists that any external sourcing of raw materials must adhere to the highest international social, environmental and governance standards and calls for strategic partnerships to include clear, specific and binding measures for mandatory due diligence on environmental, social and human rights impacts for companies involved in the supply chain;
16. Emphasises the need to respect ‘no-go zones,’ including protected areas, the deep sea and sacred sites, and to enforce regulations on conflict minerals and minerals extracted through forced or child labour;
17. Insists on robust and effective transparency measures, including public availability of all negotiation reports, memoranda of understanding, roadmaps, and impact assessments related to strategic partnerships on raw materials;
18. Requires that financial support mechanisms, such as the Global Gateway and export credit agencies, be fully transparent, inclusive and aligned with development policy objectives and communities’ needs; stresses that companies with a history of human rights abuses or environmental destruction must be excluded from participating in strategic projects;
19. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to actively engage in the negotiations for the United Nations Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights and support provisions to strengthen access to justice and remedy for victims of corporate-related human rights abuses;
20. Calls for strategic partnerships to support producer countries’ own green transition through specific, tailored language on value addition, including support for the domestic energy transition and green industrialisation, and the sharing of knowledge, technology, patents and capital;
21. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to uphold these principles in all their engagements concerning critical raw materials, ensuring that the EU’s green transition responds to the urgent need for a just global energy transition rather than replicating past colonial mistakes;
22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.