Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001578/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Angéline Furet (PfE), Philippe Olivier (PfE), Tobiasz Bocheński (ECR), Anna Bryłka (PfE), Pierre Pimpie (PfE), António Tânger Corrêa (PfE), Tomasz Buczek (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Roberto Vannacci (PfE), Petra Steger (PfE), France Jamet (PfE), Gheorghe Piperea (ECR), Pascale Piera (PfE), Petar Volgin (ESN), Petr Bystron (ESN), Sarah Knafo (ESN), Rody Tolassy (PfE), Mélanie Disdier (PfE), Gerolf Annemans (PfE)
Since 2021, the implementation of the rule of law conditionality regulation has raised concerns about a possible slide into authoritarianism by the Commission. The mechanism can be used to suspend or condition European funds on the basis of the Commission’s assessment of the internal situation in a Member State. In doing so, the Commission often exceeds its competences and appears to apply the mechanism in a biased manner, targeting governments such as those of Poland and Hungary.
- 1.How does the Commission ensure that the application of the regulation is not instrumentalised for political purposes against certain Member States, in particular those whose governments take positions which diverge from those of the European institutions?
- 2.How does it justify its intention to bypass national governments in the event of non-compliance with the rule of law, by distributing EU funds directly to the final beneficiaries, in flagrant disregard for the principle of subsidiarity, the competences of the Member States and the legal limits set by the Treaties?
- 3.Does it intend to introduce a similar conditionality mechanism which would allow Member States to temporarily suspend their contributions to the EU budget in the event of serious deficiencies or scandals within the European institutions themselves?
Supporters[1]
Submitted: 18.4.2025
- [1] This question is supported by Members other than the authors: Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (PfE), Nikola Bartůšek (PfE)