Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002097/2025
to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Rule 144
Michał Dworczyk (ECR)
Almost a decade has passed since the EU turned its attention towards military mobility. However, the plans have not been backed up by funding. Poland and other countries on the eastern flank have repeatedly emphasised that transport infrastructure is an integral part of the security architecture.
The events of 2022 confirmed this diagnosis. Military mobility has become a key element of the West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The United States has played a particularly important role, rapidly redeploying its armed forces to Central and Eastern Europe and actively supporting Ukraine through arms deliveries and effective coordination of logistics routes. Only thanks to American logistical capabilities, military reserves and efficient command was possible to act quickly and effectively strengthen security in the region.
The war in Ukraine has tested many of the assumptions underlying EU strategies. In practice, it was the Member States, NATO and the US that played a crucial role in responding to the crisis. My country has become a key hub for supporting Ukraine and European security.
In light of the above:
- 1.When planning new EU policies in the areas of defence policy and military mobility, does the Commission take into account the role played by the United States in the first weeks of the war in Ukraine?
- 2.In the event of a new security crisis, would the EU today be able to carry out a large-scale deployment of troops and equipment on its own, without US support?
- 3.In light of recent experiences and operational realities, is the requirement for a high percentage of EU-sourced components in the defence initiatives proposed by the Commission a realistic and strategically responsible approach towards allies who have proven to be crucial in times of crisis?
Submitted: 26.5.2025