Author: MIL OSI Publisher

1. The Water Resilience Strategy will offer a comprehensive vision for water-related policies. It will build on the solid existing acquis and focus on how to better implement rules for sustainable freshwater management, including the Floods Directive[1] and marine protection. It aims to improve source-to-sea water governance and awareness, enhance prevention and preparedness across economic sectors and society, enhance access to information and funding, and boost innovation. This will increase the EU’s preparedness against rapid swings between weather extremes.

The Drinking Water Directive[2] mainly regulates the quality of drinking water by setting standards for certain pollutants and requires Member States to comply with them . The directive includes provisions on risk assessment and management, meaning that local authorities must monitor changes in source water quantity and quality due to drought or floods, and adjust treatment processes accordingly. The directive’s provisions on reducing water leakage levels, restrictions of use, derogations, access to water and information to the public could also prove relevant in case of ‘climate whiplashes’. Cities vulnerable to these phenomena may need to adapt local regulations[3] or introduce temporary measures[4] to maintain water quality.

The Commission has published guidance[5] and helps Member States through the EU Biodiversity Platform[6] and its sub-groups on the Nature Restoration Regulation[7] and on Green Infrastructure[8]. Moreover, nature-based solutions are being supported through the Water Sensitive City[9] thematic partnership under the European Urban Initiative[10], the Green Cities Accord[11] and the European Green Capital and Leaf Awards[12].

• [1] Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood, OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27-34.
• [2] Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L435, 23.12.2020, p.1-62.
• [3] e.g. encouraging citizens to save water.
• [4] Such as restricting water use.
• [5] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/urban-nature-platform_en.
• [6] https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/business-and-biodiversity_en .
• [7] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/nature-and-biodiversity/nature-restoration-regulation_en .
• [8] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/nature-and-biodiversity/green-infrastructure_en .
• [9] https://www.urbanagenda.urban-initiative.eu/partnerships/water-sensitive-city .
• [10] https://www.urban-initiative.eu/ .
• [11] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/green-city-accord_en .
• [12] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/urban-environment/european-green-capital-award_en .

Question for written answer  E-001911/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Thomas Bajada (S&D)

The recently announced New Pact for the Mediterranean, expected later this year, envisages building comprehensive partnerships focused on areas of mutual interest. New instruments would also require new financial backing.

In this regard, can the Commission clarify:

• 1.what the expected cost of the New Pact for the Mediterranean will be;
• 2.whether there will be new funding instruments to support its efficient and effective implementation;
• 3.whether there will be a prioritisation of funding, such as, but not limited to, enhancing areas of mutual interest that bring our southern neighbours closer to the EU at the diplomatic level?

Submitted: 13.5.2025

The Schengen Borders Code[1] defines a border guard as ‘any public official assigned, in accordance with national law, to a border crossing point or along the border or the immediate vicinity of that border who carries out […] border control tasks’ . It follows that Member States have discretion in designating the public officials authorised to exercise the functions of border guards. In accordance with Article 39(1)(d) of the Schengen Borders Code, Member States are required to notify the Commission of the list of the national services responsible for border control.

As for Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard ( EBCG) Regulation[2] clarifies that the EBCG shall implement European integrated border management as a shared responsibility of the Agency and of the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards, as well as the national authorities responsible for return. Member States retain primary responsibility for the management of their sections of the external borders. It remains the prerogative of the Member State to designate the responsible national authorities to cooperate with Frontex in the implementation of these tasks.

• [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
• [2] Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624.

Commission Decision C(2023)5035 final of 19 July 2023 outlines the grounds for the enforced recovery procedure. It was established that Projekt Forum Zdruzenie (PFZ), coordinator of the project ‘Mirrors of Europe’ failed to respect its substantial obligations under the Grant Agreement signed for the above-mentioned project. As such, it was requested to return the EU funding due to this breach of obligations.

Regarding the co-financing of the project, it was established that the documents provided by the project coordinator, including the financial statement was still not balanced and therefore did not comply with the requirements of the Grant Agreement, and that there was no financial contribution made by PFZ and its co-organisers to the project.

The Commission is aware of the claim initiated in 2019 by the project coordinator, and of the decision by the European Ombudsman[1], who found no maladministration in the Education and Culture Executive Agency’s decision to recover the funds. Once all means of recovering the funds unduly received by the project, as put in place by the Commission services and the Agency, had failed (including debit note, reminders, formal notices, full repayment, repayment by instalment, offsetting, etc.), the sole remaining action was the enforced recovery procedure initiated via the above-mentioned Commission Decision.

Commission Decision C(2023)5035 outlines the grounds for the enforced recovery procedure.

• [1] European Ombudsman https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/120801.

The EU and South Africa (SA) have a Strategic Partnership based, among other, on democratic values and human rights, as exemplified by the recent EU-SA Summit, where the EU announced the Global Gateway Investment Package with South Africa to which the Honourable Member refers. This package will mainly support projects promoting SA’s clean and just energy transition. In the context of this partnership, the EU and SA are engaged in a regular human rights dialogue.

With Global Gateway, the EU aims to embed democratic principles, and transparency in all investments. The EU assesses in each country whether the required pre-conditions for investments exist, including regarding human rights.

When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it takes all measures deemed fit and informs without delay the European Anti-Fraud Office and, where applicable, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

The new Financial Regulation (Article 6(3))[1] makes an explicit reference to the EU values, including human dignity, freedom, democracy, and the rights of minorities, and requires that the EU budget be implemented in full respect of such values. In cases of serious human rights violations, the Commission may take precautionary and/or corrective measures such as suspending or terminating contracts, carrying out internal or external audits, verifying expenditures, and applying other relevant controls.

• [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509?utm_source.

Page Group Ltd is a United Kingdom based private security company (PSC) providing security services to the European Union Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law[1] ( EUPOL COPPS). The company delivers security services such as 24/7 on-site guarding of the premises and monitors all moves of the Mission and the security situation in the area of operations.

The strike of the PSC personnel started on 8 January 2025 and ended on 22 January 2025. Page Group Ltd informed EUPOL COPPS that the interruption of the service was due to internal issues between Page Group Ltd and its local employees falling outside the remits of EUPOL COPPS. The Mission immediately requested the management of Page Group Ltd to resolve the issue as soon as possible.

In parallel, a business continuity plan was implemented by EUPOL COPPS for the duration of the strike, focusing on a seamless continuation of the provision of the security services such as Warden and Duty Security Officer duties using Mission staff.

• [1] https://eupolcopps.eu/.

Targeting the so-called Russian shadow fleet has been an integral part of several sanctions packages against Russia adopted by the Council. The most recent 16th package of sanctions against Russia, adopted by the Council 24 February 2025, which was designed to further ramp up pressure on the aggressor, touches upon vital sectors of the Russian economy such as energy, trade, transport, infrastructure and financial services and introduces further measures aimed at tackling circumvention. In this latter respect, the 16th package adds further vessels to the list of those subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport. This concerns non-EU tankers which are part of Russia’s shadow fleet circumventing the oil price cap mechanism while conducting irregular and high-risk shipping practices — thus possibly posing safety and/or environmental risks –, support the energy sector of Russia, or vessels that are responsible for transporting military equipment for Russia or stolen Ukrainian grain. In total, 153 vessels from third countries are currently listed.

The Council explicitly acknowledges the environmental risks posed by Russia’s shadow fleet. Those risks have in particular been flagged by the International Maritime Organisation in its General Assembly resolution A.1192(33), adopted on 6 December 2023. Recital 6 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/388 of 24 February 2025 indicates that ‘for the purposes of those oil exports, Russia is increasingly reliant on a fleet of vessels involved in substandard and high-risk shipping practices such as operating with inadequate or inexistent insurance (“shadow fleet”). Those vessels pose significant maritime safety and environmental risks for the Union, its coastal Member States and third-country coastal states. […] Discouraging persons and entities from undertaking and facilitating high-risk shipping practices when transporting Russian-origin oil and disrupting shadow

fleet operations therefore contribute to undermining revenue generation for the Russian war efforts while at the same time supporting international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment’. This is why the Council introduced a new listing criterion as part of the 16th package targeting those who support the operations of tankers transporting Russian oil while conducting irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). The objective is to disrupt the network behind the too-often unsafe oil tankers that now widely support Russian oil exports, which will help in turn to address circumvention of the oil price cap and environmental risks linked to the shadow fleet.

This matter concerns issues of implementing EU law, which does not fall in principle within the competence of the Council. The Council does not have access to the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is a highly secure and protected database exclusively accessible to authorised users within competent authorities, such as the police and the border guard. These authorities are the sole responsible for data processing in the SIS, including entering and consulting alerts on persons.

National human rights institutions, ombudspersons, equality bodies and other independent authorities have an important role in national checks and balances. The Commission monitors developments related to the functioning and independence of these authorities in the context of its Annual Rule of Law Cycle[1]. As regards Greece, the 2024 Rule of Law Report[2] took note of investigations by the ombudsperson into alleged misconduct involving law enforcement officers. As further noted in the report, the Commission considers that effective and timely investigations of such incidents are an important demonstration of the ability of competent authorities to deliver an adequate response. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in this area and will provide an up-to-date assessment in its 2025 Rule of Law Report.

• [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en.
• [2] 2024 Rule of Law Report, country chapter on the rule of law situation in Greece. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6741f4b2-6a10-44ba-b40c-97a5a38e6827_en?filename=21_1_58062_coun_chap_greece_en.pdf.

1. Striving for equality for all and equality in all of its senses continues to be central to the Commission’s work to comprehensively tackle discrimination in the EU. This is why the Commission is fully committed to continue leading efforts at the EU level to do more for everyone to live freely, thrive and lead, regardless of who they are, particularly with the new strategies to be adopted on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) equality, anti-racism and gender equality, the full implementation of the Strategic framework for Roma equality[1], the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities[2] and the recent adoption of the Roadmap for women’s rights[3].

2. In line with the interinstitutional agreement on better law making[4], the Commission provided the reasons proposing the intended withdrawal in the Annex IV of the 2025 Commission work programme, together with a time indication[5]. The Commission will take due account of the positions of the European Parliament and the Council before deciding on the withdrawal of the proposal.

3. The proposal for the Equal Treatment Directive[6] file has been under discussion for almost 17 years and almost every Presidency has placed the file on the agenda of the Council, including the comprehensive efforts to arrive at a compromise text of the Belgian Presidency during the first half of 2024. However, despite all these efforts and the Commission comprehensively supporting the legislative process, it has not been possible to reach the required unanimity and there is no clear prospect that unanimity could be reached in the foreseeable future.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1813.
• [2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/disability/union-equality-strategy-rights-persons-disabilities-2021-2030_en.
• [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_681.
• [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2016/512/oj/eng.
• [5] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/7617998c-86e6-4a74-b33c-249e8a7938cd_en?filename=COM_2025_45_1_annexes_EN.pdf.
• [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52008PC0426.