Author: MIL OSI Publisher

The Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus[1] is designed to gradually phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers through a transitional approach.

This involves measured annual customs duty increases on imports from Russia of such fertilisers over a period of three years, minimising the risk of potential price impacts.

Its entry into force is dependent on the conclusion of the ordinary legislative procedure currently ongoing in the European Parliament and the Council.

If the proposal is adopted in its current form, the Commission expects the measure to result in a gradual and orderly replacement of Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers with alternatives, including domestically produced ones, contributing to fair competition in the EU fertilisers market and supporting a stable, long term role of the EU fertilisers industry in ensuring the EU food security.

For broader background, some fertilisers (potash) from Russia are currently subject to an import quota as part of the sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine[2].

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)34&lang=en
• [2] Article 3(i) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250225

Question for written answer  E-001586/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

Türkiye has been funded mainly through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). From 2002-2022, Türkiye received more than €9 billion, with the objectives of ‘supporting political reforms, strengthening civil society, protecting the environment and promoting regional development and the rule of law’.

During the first IPA programming period (2007–2013), Türkiye received around €4.8 billion. In the second phase (2014–2020), €4.5 billion was approved, but part of this was ‘frozen’ due to events following the ‘2016 coup’. From 2021 onwards, funding continued under supposedly stricter conditions and supposedly increased oversight.

The EU has also provided funding for ‘humanitarian programmes for Syrian refugees in Türkiye, through the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’, amounting to over €6 billion since 2016 to date.

In total, Türkiye has received over €18 billion from the EU through these two main mechanisms. In addition, the European Investment Bank has provided Türkiye with loans of €29.3 billion for 278 projects from 1987 to 2018, further strengthening the EU’s financial support to the country.

Can the Commission, in terms of the value of the euro today, calculate the total amount of grants, technical assistance and soft loans to Türkiye?

Submitted: 21.4.2025

The Commission would like to kindly refer the Honourable Member to the publicly available Financial Transparency System (FTS)[1].

In accordance with Article 38 of the Financial Regulation[2], on the FTS portal, the Commission makes available information of grant recipients of funds financed from the budget . The information concerning financial year 2024 will be published in June 2025.

The Commission implements EU funding fully in line with the relevant EU legislation adopted by the EU legislator, in particular the Financial Regulation, which sets out the relevant provisions to ensure that the financial interests of the Union budget are protected.

For example, the Financial Regulation sets out specific rules to ensure that procurement and grant funding from the EU budget respect equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1-239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein .
• [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509

Question for written answer  E-001677/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Pina Picierno (S&D)

Vladimir Solovyev, a well-known Russian journalist and television presenter considered one of the Kremlin’s leading propagandists, was added to the European Union’s sanctions list on 23 February 2022. His assets were frozen and he was banned from entering Member States, including Italy, where his properties worth EUR 8 million were seized.

In March 2025, his planned appearance on the programme ‘Lo Stato delle cose’ on Italian state television (Rai 3) was cancelled following a report.

The Italian platform Byoblu, which has always been aligned with Russian narrative, continues to play a key role in spreading Kremlin propaganda, supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine and promoting narratives hostile to the EU and its democratic values, including attacks such as that by spokesperson Zakharova against President Mattarella. On 24 April 2025, that platform announced a new invitation to Solovyev.

In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

• 1.Is the Commission aware of the practice of two Italian media outlets issuing invitations to Solovyev, in breach of EU sanctions?
• 2.What measures does it intend to take to ensure compliance and combat pro-Russian disinformation in the Union?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001675/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Gerald Hauser (PfE)

Scientific publications document cases of liver damage following vaccination against COVID-19, including immune-mediated hepatitis, acute liver cell injury and liver impairment in transplant patients. Here are a few examples:

– Liver injury following SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: A multicenter case series[1]

– Liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: Features of immune-mediated hepatitis, role of corticosteroid therapy and outcome[2]

– Histological and serological features of acute liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination[3]

– Risk of acute liver injury following the mRNA (BNT162b2) and inactivated (CoronaVac) COVID-19 vaccines[4]

– Severe de novo liver injury after Moderna vaccination – not always autoimmune hepatitis[5]

Not only can liver damage be caused by mRNA vaccination, but the vaccines also have a wide range of other side effects.

• 1.In hindsight, what does the Commission make of the scientific diligence shown in authorising the mRNA vaccines in view of the wide range of side effects they have?
• 2.Are any investigations currently being carried out by the Commission or subordinate EU authorities into the safety of mRNA vaccines?
• 3.Were potential hepatotoxicity, genotoxicity, cardiotoxic effects, immunotoxicity, neurotoxic effects and possible long-term effects on liver function and genetic integrity investigated when the mRNA vaccines were authorised?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

• [1] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34339763/
• [2] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35567545/
• [3] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36440259/
• [4] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35817224/
• [5] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35439566/

The European Accessibility Act is a directive with legal base Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under this legal base, the legislator can adopt measures for the approximation of laws in the Member States, with the objective of the establishment and functioning of the internal market.

The related Impact Assessment clarified that there was no national legislation on accessibility of domestic appliances. Hence no barriers in the market due to divergent legislation were identified, with domestic appliances falling outside the scope of the Commission proposal.

Nevertheless, the Commission supports the accessibility of user interfaces including by the development of accessibility standards, such as those under standardisation request M587 regarding the accessibility requirements of products and services in support of the European Accessibility Act[1]. These could help manufacturers of domestic appliances to address accessibility of their products.

In addition, through the AccessibleEU centre, the Commission supports capacity building and training on accessibility including for manufacturing industries.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/enorm/mandate/587_en

Question for written answer  E-001623/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Cecilia Strada (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

At the end of March 2025, a bill amending the Polish Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners entered into force. The new provisions allow the temporary suspension of the right to apply for asylum for migrants entering Poland via its border with Belarus. This bill could pave the way to violations of the non-refoulement principle, as clearly stated by the UNHCR[1] and the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights[2]. It is not the first time that Poland has tried to give legal ground to pushback practices[3].

These provisions could come into force against a backdrop of a recurring use of pushback practices at the Poland-Belarus border, as reported by several NGOs and researchers[4], and while Poland stands accused of refoulements before the European Court of Human Rights[5].

Considering that the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions are binding and unavoidable for Poland:

• 1.Can the Commission assess the situation on the Poland-Belarus border, notably in relation to the latest report on pushback practices[6]?
• 2.Which initiatives does the Commission intend to pursue in order to ensure that Poland abides by Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture?

Submitted: 23.4.2025

• [1] https://www.refworld.org/legal/natlegcomments/unhcr/2024/en/149257
• [2] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/en/content/chr-draft-amendment-act-granting-protection-foreigners-territory-republic-poland-opinion
• [3] G. Baranowska, Pushbacks in Poland: grounding the practice in domestic law in 2021, Polish Yearbook of International Law.
• [4] Inter alia: C. Greener, D. Ozynska, Brutal Barriers. Pushbacks, violence and the violation of human rights on the Poland-Belarus border; Pushed, beaten, left to die. European pushback report 2024; Human Rights Watch, Poland: brutal pushbacks at the Belarus border, 10 December 2024.
• [5] R.A. and Others v. Poland (no. 42120/21), European court of Human Rights.
• [6] C. Greener, D. Ozynska, Brutal Barriers. Pushbacks, violence and the violation of human rights on the Poland-Belarus border.