Author: MIL OSI Publisher

Question for written answer  E-001657/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Sérgio Gonçalves (S&D)

The reprogramming of cohesion policy funds to support new areas, including affordable housing and defence industry investments, constitutes a major strategic shift. While it is important to respond to emerging challenges, there is a risk of undermining structural investment goals. The proposed 100 % co-financing rate may reduce financial engagement, while the decision to extend implementation deadlines solely for reprogrammed funds appears unjustified, considering recent exceptional disruptions. Many projects were already reshuffled between instruments as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the overlap with the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

Given this:

• 1.Does the Commission not fear that full co-financing and the extension of deadlines for new priority projects will lead the Member States to deprioritise long-term cohesion investments?
• 2.What indicators will be used to assess performance in new areas, particularly housing and defence, and what role will national and regional authorities play in monitoring defence-related investments?
• 3.Does the Commission envisage any of these new areas becoming a permanent part of cohesion policy?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001654/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left)

In July 2024, Sweden gave notification of a legislative proposal to introduce sales of alcoholic beverages in Sweden on producers’ sites. The proposal was subject to the standard notification process, with one Member State, as well as a number of stakeholders, regarding the proposal as contrary to the EU Treaties under Articles 34 and 36.

The Commission opted not to comment on the notification. With that in mind:

• 1.Does the Commission regard the Swedish proposal on sales on producers’ sites as compatible with a continued retail monopoly under Article 37 TFEU?
• 2.Does the decision by the Commission not to comment during the TRIS process mean that it shares the Swedish Government’s interpretation of the EU Treaties and therefore does not see any risk of discrimination against other Member States’ producers?
• 3.Why did the Commission opt not to set out its legal appraisal during the notification procedure?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

As stated in the communication on ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework[1]’, the EU budget must continue to play a central role in promoting the EU’s prosperity, competitiveness, sovereignty, security, resilience, preparedness and global influence, while upholding the highest standards on rule of law and democratic values.

In light of the policy and budgetary challenges the EU is facing for the EU budget to achieve these objectives, the status quo is not an option. Among others, the global political and economic landscape poses challenges of unprecedented magnitude.

The scale of the challenges ahead calls for an ambitious budget, both in size and design. The next long-term budget will have to address the complexities, weaknesses and rigidities that are currently present and maximise the impact of every euro it spends, focusing on EU priorities and objectives where the EU action is mostly needed.

• [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0046

The Commission promotes the uptake of sustainability considerations in public procurement, including those related to the environmental and social impact of the services and products purchased by public buyers, in line with current EU public procurement rules.

It does so through guidance, capacity building initiatives[1], supporting Member State Joint Actions[2] and the EU green public procurement criteria, including specific criteria for the food and catering sector[3].

The Commission is also preparing criteria that could help contracting authorities to introduce, on a voluntary basis, sustainability aspects in the food and catering services that they are buying.

The Political Guidelines 2024-2029[4] announced a revision of the 2014 EU public procurement Directives[5]. At the moment the Commission is carrying out an evaluation of these Directives[6] to assess whether EU public procurement rules work as intended. Once the evaluation is completed the Commission will consider concrete measures and options to shape the new proposal.

It will notably seek to further support ‘best value’ purchases, to reward quality and sustainability as set forward in Vision for Agriculture and Food[7].

• [1] https://public-buyers-community.ec.europa.eu/communities
• [2] https://bestremap.eu/procurement/; https://preventncd.eu/work-packages/wp-05/public-food-procurement-in-public-settings-in-the-eu/
• [3] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f8e9fe10-ff7d-11e9-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
• [4] https://commission.europa.eu/about/commission-2024-2029_en
• [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/23/oj/eng; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj/eng
• [6] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14427-Public-procurement-directives-evaluation_en
• [7] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/vision-agriculture-food_en

Question for written answer  E-001656/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Sérgio Gonçalves (S&D)

The Commission’s proposal to allow up to 100 % co-financing for new cohesion policy priorities raises serious concerns about the impact on less developed regions and the outermost regions, which rely heavily on stable long-term cohesion support. Redirecting funding from structural objectives to new thematic areas, without providing additional resources, risks undermining the core mission of cohesion policy. Furthermore, orienting funds towards sectors such as defence, which are often concentrated in more industrialised areas, may exacerbate territorial imbalances and divert resources away from regions that still face significant development gaps.

In this context:

• 1.What guarantees can the Commission offer that less developed regions and the outermost regions will not experience a net loss of cohesion funding?
• 2.Does the Commission not agree that new priorities should be matched with additional funding rather than drawing from existing allocations?
• 3.How will the Commission safeguard territorial balance, particularly where large companies and more developed regions may have a competitive advantage in absorbing redirected funds?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

The automotive industry is a core engine of European prosperity. The sector accounts for EUR 1 trillion in gross domestic product, a third of private research and development investment in the EU and it provides direct and indirect employment to 13 million Europeans.

However, the European automotive sector is at a critical turning point, challenged by rapid technological changes and increasing competition.

Against this background, the President of the Commission in January 2025 launched a Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry[1], a collaborative and inclusive process designed to tackle the sector’s most pressing challenges. On 5 March 2025, the Commission put forward an Action Plan[2], which builds on the Strategic Dialogue.

The action plan sets out concrete measures to help secure global competitiveness of the European automotive industry and maintain a strong European production base.

It also includes measures to ensure better support for workers affected by the transition of the sector. In particular, the Commission has proposed to extend the scope of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to also support workers threatened by imminent job displacement.

Additionally, the Commission is working with social partners and Member States to increase European Social Fund Plus funding for the automotive sector, supporting workers who want to reskill and look for new job opportunities.

The Commission is using the mid-term review to incentivise Member States to reprogramme more funding to these ends. Moreover, the Commission will work with social partners to prepare a Quality Jobs Roadmap to be published towards the end of 2025.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_378
• [2] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en?filename=Communication%20-%20Action%20Plan.pdf

Priority question for written answer  P-001672/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Fernand Kartheiser (ECR), Piotr Müller (ECR), Gheorghe Piperea (ECR), Jacek Ozdoba (ECR), Laurence Trochu (ECR), Kristoffer Storm (ECR), Dominik Tarczyński (ECR), Hermann Tertsch (PfE), Geadis Geadi (ECR)

Article 91 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) provides for a review of the Act by November 2025 regarding the designation of very large online platforms, their scope, and the DSA’s compatibility with various legal instruments.

The DSA has been heavily criticised by the current US administration, by European politicians and by human rights defenders who have reported and documented its impact on fundamental rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression.

In this context, a well-rounded review process assessing the impact of the DSA on the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is needed.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

• 1.What procedures and timeline will the Commission follow for the review of the DSA by November 2025, and does it already envisage changes to the Act?
• 2.Given the DSA’s stated aim of balancing platform accountability with fundamental rights (recital 3 and Article 1), will the Commission assess the DSA’s impact on freedom of expression during the review?
• 3.What role can Parliament, the Council of the EU, civil society, human rights groups, tech companies and researchers play in the Act’s review?

Supporter[1]

Submitted: 24.4.2025

• [1] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR)