Author: MIL OSI Publisher

Question for written answer  E-001664/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Beatrice Timgren (ECR), Charlie Weimers (ECR), Dick Erixon (ECR)

In its press release of 14 April 2025, the Commission welcomed the Council’s endorsement of the first element of the simplification omnibus on sustainability[1]. The postponement, until 2028, of key obligations under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive was presented as a first step toward delivering legal certainty and reducing unnecessary compliance costs for companies.

The Commission’s commitment to simplification is a welcome first step towards repairing an overregulated system that is killing jobs and exporting our industry to non-EU countries.

Considering that extending timelines and slightly reducing reporting requirements will not solve the competitiveness crisis caused by the overburdening acquis communautaire:

• 1.Will the Commission establish measurable targets for reducing reporting obligations?
• 2.Will the Commission commit to a broader and more ambitious programme of mass deregulation across EU legislation, extending beyond sustainability-related laws?
• 3.What further actions will the Commission take to make sure growth is never again hampered by red tape from Brussels?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_25_1057.

Question for written answer  E-001620/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE)

Since December 2022, the Commission has frozen a significant part of EU funds to Hungary because of systemic corruption, rule of law deficiencies and fundamental rights violations in that country. Further to its answer to written question E-002481/2023[1], can the Commission provide an updated overview of the amount of EU funds that has been paid to Hungary from 1 January 2023 to the present date? Please also indicate again from which budget lines the transfers were made.

Submitted: 23.4.2025

• [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2023-002481-ASW_EN.html

Question for written answer  E-001619/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Per Clausen (The Left)

During the many debates about what is a needlessly low threshold for public procurement in the EU, including as regards the considerable administrative costs and burdens associated with tenders for which no-one submits bids because they involve such small amounts, one of a number assertions that have been made is that the EU will itself not be able to modify the threshold because of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and agreements, as described in Article 6 of the Procurement Directive[1]. But can it really be true that the EU is not in a position to determine when public bodies in the EU and Member States should put contracts out to public tender?

Accordingly:

• 1.Can the Commission confirm that the EU is powerless to raise or lower thresholds for public procurement in the EU or in Member States without first securing a review of the public-procurement thresholds in the WTO Government Procurement Agreement?
• 2.What is the estimated amount of administrative costs that the EU and individual Member States could save if the threshold for public procurement were raised to EUR 1 million?

Submitted: 23.4.2025

• [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0024

Question for written answer  E-001630/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

Greek sheep and goat farming is facing serious difficulties, especially during the Easter period, as demand reaches 750 000 lambs and kids, while domestic production this year does not extend beyond 450 000. This gap is covered by imports, mainly from EU countries where producer prices are lower (e.g. EUR 4.4/kg in Romania, EUR 8/kg in Greece). With retail prices at EUR 14-16/kg, producers ultimately make a loss instead of a profit. Also, during the same period, increased export activity is observed to countries such as Italy, France and Germany (350 000 in 2024).

At the same time, instances of ‘Greekification’ are being reported, where imported lambs and kids are misleadingly presented as Greek. In addition, cases of peste des petits ruminants have recently re-emerged in Romania and the Commission has decided to ban the movement of sheep and goats from there to other Member States.

In view of the above:

• 1.What checks are the competent European and national authorities required to carry out to ensure compliance with the legislation on the labelling and traceability of imported lambs and kids, and how does the Commission ensure that these checks are carried out?
• 2.How does the Commission intend to provide practical support for domestic sheep and goat farming, in order to ensure the viability of producers and Greek market sufficiency?

Submitted: 23.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001655/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Paulius Saudargas (PPE), Liudas Mažylis (PPE), Matej Tonin (PPE)

In May 2022, in response to the disruption of global energy markets caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Commission proposed the REPowerEU Plan to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027.

Three years on, the EU has successfully achieved many of the ambitious targets set out in the REPowerEU Plan and is now on the right path to completely eliminate Russian fossil fuels.

The Commission has committed to submitting a roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports and ensuring the full implementation of the REPowerEU Plan, which will lay out the proposed measures to entirely phase out all supplies of Russian fossil fuel. According to the Commission’s work programme for this year, the roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports was meant to be submitted for Q1 2025.

To ensure Europe’s energy security and sovereignty, the EU must fully end its remaining energy imports from Russia. However, the delay in submitting the REPowerEU roadmap, which will lay out the concrete measures to achieve this fundamental goal, raises concerns. We call on the Commission to maintain its determination and deliver the roadmap as soon as possible.

Given this, we would like to ask:

When does the Commission plan to submit the REPowerEU Roadmap?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001665/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Beatrice Timgren (ECR), Charlie Weimers (ECR), Dick Erixon (ECR)

The extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to include road transport and buildings under ETS 2 is expected to significantly raise energy costs for households across the EU. According to a recent analysis, the cost of this measure could be as much as EUR 650 per year for Belgian households.[1]

This raises concerns about the distributive effects of the revised ETS, especially at a time when many families are already struggling with inflation and high energy prices. The largest burden will fall disproportionately on middle- and lower-income citizens in colder, car-dependent regions.

• 1.Does the Commission acknowledge that the revised ETS places a disproportionate financial burden on certain Member States and certain households, e.g. those living in colder rural areas?
• 2.In the light of the disproportionate burden placed on certain households, has the Commission considered adjusting the ETS so that it does not punish households that are not eligible for compensation from the Social Climate Fund, but which are still hit with considerably increased expenses?
• 3.Considering the strained financial situation for many households, has the Commission considered pausing the implementation of the revised ETS, and what would the consequences on climate and household economy be if such a pause took place?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

• [1] https://energyville.be/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ETS2-paper_final-15042025.pdf.

Question for written answer  E-001414/2025/rev.1
to the Commission
Rule 144
Nikos Pappas (The Left)

According to a recent case study on Thessaloniki,[1] from 2008 onwards, sky-rocketing property prices were accompanied by excessive housing loans, which, at the onset of the economic crisis, resulted in mass foreclosures and the ownership of a large number of properties being transferred to the banks. With a view to limiting financial losses, the banks avoided putting these properties on the market, whereas they are now actively reappearing through the banks’ own brokerage mechanisms or sales to investment funds. The thousands of unsold properties, which are mostly small and old, remain out of use by society. This exacerbates the decline of the already limited housing stock and acts as a catalyst for increased market and rental prices.

In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

• 1.How does the Commission intend to address the artificial holding of real estate by banks and funds, which hampers accessibility to affordable housing, especially in urban centres, and examine whether this practice constitutes a form of unfair competition to the detriment of both tenants and private owners?
• 2.Does it intend to regulate, at EU level, the activities of investment funds and servicers in the housing sector, in order to ensure transparency and the protection of social housing?
• 3.How could the Commission help ensure that national tax incentives (e.g. exemptions for renovations) do not create unequal treatment in favour of large landlords to the detriment of tenants and vulnerable groups?

Submitted: 7.4.2025

• [1] Hatziprokopiou, P., Mangou, I. Siatitsa, D. (2024), Assessing vacant homes in the Municipality of Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki Social Atlas, https://thessalonikisocialatlas.arch.auth.gr/en/items/prosengizontas-tis-kenes-katoikies-sto-dimo-thessalonikis/

Question for written answer  E-001662/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Hilde Vautmans (Renew)

The war in Ukraine has reasserted the importance of main battle tanks (MBTs) in modern warfare, highlighting the need for the European Union to develop a more unified and capable defence industry. With the variety of MBT models currently in use across Europe, military interoperability remains a challenge. Several European initiatives, such as the Main ARmoured Tank of Europe (MARTE) and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programmes, aim to create a common European MBT, but significant technological, political and industrial challenges remain.

What actions is the Commission taking to overcome the industrial challenges of coordinating the efforts of various EU Member States and defence contractors, ensuring that competing national interests do not hinder the development of a common European main battle tank?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001663/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Beatrice Timgren (ECR), Charlie Weimers (ECR), Dick Erixon (ECR)

The Commission recently launched a EUR 5 million call[1] under the Digital Europe Programme to strengthen the European Fact-Checking Standards Network[2].

Objectives covered by the funding from Brussels include expanding fact-checking capacity, developing sustainable business models and protecting fact checkers from harassment while providing them with legal and relocation support. The further funding of such centralised structures risks consolidating influence among a limited number of actors who lack democratic legitimacy and political neutrality. Unlike the transparent and consensus-based model used in Community Notes on X – now being adopted by other platforms such as Facebook and Instagram[3] – the Commission’s approach relies on opaque selection and review processes. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has pointed out that fact checkers often exhibit a left-leaning bias.

The current US presidential administration has criticised centralised fact-checking as undemocratic. Continued EU reliance on such models may undermine free speech and further strain transatlantic ties.

Bearing in mind what has been said above:

• 1.Why has the Commission adopted a critical view of relatively more transparent and open-source alternatives to fact-checking, such as Community Notes?
• 2.Has the Commission assessed the risk of its model being perceived as institutionalised censorship, with negative implications for public confidence and EU-US relations?
• 3.How will the Commission evaluate fact checkers’ independence and neutrality when offering them legal and relocation support under the proposed fact checkers protection scheme?

Submitted: 24.4.2025

• [1] European Commission, EU Funding & Tenders Portal, Call for proposal: European Network of Factcheckers, https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/DIGITAL-2025-BESTUSE-08-FACTCHECKERS?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&frameworkProgramme=43152860&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate.
• [2] European Commission, Digital Europe Programme: Call for proposals – Accelerating the Best Use of Technologies, 1 April 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/digital/wp-call/2025/call-fiche_digital-2025-bestuse-08_en.pdf.
• [3] Meta, ‘More Speech and Fewer Mistakes’, 7 January 2025, https://about.fb.com/news/2025/03/testing-begins-community-notes-facebook-instagram-threads/.

Question for written answer  E-001633/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Christine Anderson (ESN)

Multiple credible sources confirm that foreign state actors, among them the Russian Federation and Belarus, have deliberately weaponised illegal migration as part of their hybrid warfare strategy, targeting EU Member States such as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Norway. These operations reportedly involve the facilitation of third-country migrants through Russian territory using official visas, coercive tactics by Belarusian border authorities, and involvement by Russian intelligence and trafficking networks[1][2][3][4][5][6][7].

Given the evidence of this threat, can the Commission respond to the following:

• 1.Does the Commission recognise Russia’s (and Belarus’s) deliberate facilitation of irregular migration as a component of state-directed hybrid warfare? If so, what assessments or designations has it made in cooperation with relevant EU agencies (e.g. Frontex or the European External Action Service)?
• 2.What specific legal instruments or coordinated EU measures are currently in place or under consideration to address the use of migration as a geopolitical weapon, including in terms of border control, visa policy and sanctions?
• 3.How is the Commission supporting frontline Member States in returning migrants that have been taking part in hybrid attacks on EU external borders, and how many of them have been returned thus far?

Submitted: 23.4.2025

• [1] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west.
• [2] https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/russias-weaponization-migrants-hasnt-gone-away.
• [3] https://etias.com/articles/eu-border-measures-target-migrant-weaponization-by-russia,-belarus.
• [4] https://ukandeu.ac.uk/border-and-migration-politics-and-the-kremlins-hybrid-war/.
• [5] https://www.hoover.org/research/weaponization-migration-powerful-instrument-russias-hybrid-toolbox.
• [6] https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/nov/16/russias-weaponization-of-migrants-hasnt-gone-away/.
• [7] https://mwi.westpoint.edu/weaponized-migration-in-eastern-europes-frozen-north-do-not-overlook-russian-hybrid-warfare/.