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Question for written answer  E-001927/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Thierry Mariani (PfE)

Today, Central Asia is at the heart of the geo-economic recomposition between Europe and Asia, and regional connectivity is an essential lever for stability, trade integration and energy resilience.

Against this backdrop, the President of the European Commission announced on 4 April 2025, at the inauguration of the Samarkand Climate Forum, that a further EUR 12 billion would be made available under the Global Gateway initiative.

Can the Commission give details of the new regional projects envisaged, particularly with regard to regional connectivity, transport infrastructure, energy and transnational digital networks between the countries of Central Asia?

Submitted: 14.5.2025

Question for written answer  E-001940/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

On 7 May 2025, Parliament adopted a decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the Commission budget for 2023. The amendment I drafted[1], adopted by Parliament, forms an integral part of the document. Paragraph 192 of the decision states that Parliament ‘expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission’[2].

The fact that Parliament, in fulfilling its legal obligations to audit the Commission, deemed it necessary to address this issue in the budget document reflects the serious nature of the accusations, as well as the need for transparency and responsibility from the Commission.

I therefore ask the Commission:

• 1.Has the Commission conducted any internal investigations to determine whether the money laundering accusations are at all connected to Didier Reynders’s activities as a Member of the College of Commissioners?
• 2.Has the Commission contacted the Belgian authorities in relation to this issue and has it received any information from Belgian investigators? Is the Commission actively working with Belgian law enforcement and, if so, to what extent?

Given the importance of this matter as well as its potential consequences on EU citizens’ trust in EU institutions, I expect a prompt, clear and comprehensive reply.

Submitted: 14.5.2025

• [1] Amendment 32: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2025-0074-AM-024-033_EN.pdf
• [2] European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission, executive agencies and the ninth, tenth and eleventh European Development Funds (2024/2019(DEC)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0077_EN.pdf

Question for written answer  E-001939/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Lynn Boylan (The Left)

The Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) recently announced that it would disband its unit responsible for social economy and social entrepreneurship as of 1 May. This will result in a loss of institutional knowledge, undermine progress achieved and stall future advances for the social economy. And yet social enterprises are an important pillar of the EU economy, employing over 11 million people and with a turnover of nearly EUR 1 trillion. The social economy is unique in that it provides a path to achieve our environmental, social and economic objectives in a harmonious way.

• 1.Will the Commission explain the rationale for removing responsibility for this important economic sector from the DG responsible for the internal market?
• 2.With the transferal of responsibility for the social economy to the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, how will DG GROW ensure that its policies continue to support and promote the social economy?
• 3.Will the Commission provide an explanation for the sudden stop to the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises funding calls?

Submitted: 14.5.2025

Question for written answer  E-001983/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Martin Häusling (Verts/ALE)

Under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/688, supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429, payable certificates for official health checks have applied to all cross-border consignments of kept birds between Member States since 2021. The costs involved range between EUR 70 and EUR 250. Those costs place a considerable burden on hobby keepers when attending animal shows and have cut cross-border participation to almost zero. They also pose obstacles within the EU that threaten the preservation of rare and old breeds. In the case of pedigree poultry shows, documentation is provided by the show management: the animals are ringed and the corresponding keepers’ addresses and registration numbers are recorded.

• 1.Does the Commission intend to cut red tape for cross-border pedigree poultry consignments for the purposes of registered animal shows and do away with the obligation to carry out veterinary health checks?
• 2.Does the Commission agree that the commercial transport of commercial poultry – which involves large quantities, high frequency and long distances – differs from hobby pedigree poultry breeding, meaning the TRACES requirements should not apply to hobby keepers?
• 3.What steps does the Commission intend to take to support breeders of traditional poultry breeds transported across borders, or would breeders’ self-declarations and corresponding documentation, along with animal show documentation, be be an appropriate replacement for TRACES in the hobby sector?

Submitted: 16.5.2025

Priority question for written answer  P-002056/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Elena Donazzan (ECR)

DG GROW has discussed the final report submitted by QLab, which proposes amendments to Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 that include unjustified limits on total chromium content, which would prevent the recovery of hides from the tanning sector.

The proposal is inapplicable as national fertiliser and health rules on animal by-products have always ensured high levels of safety. Moreover, there is scientific evidence from 2024 that trivalent chromium does not pose a risk, and ECHA has recently reiterated that any restrictions should apply only to hexavalent chromium.

This proposal would undermine two strategic sectors (fertilisers and tanning) that are committed to strict safety and environmental sustainability practices. As such, the Commission’s failure to adopt a clear position on the proposal is incomprehensible.

In view of the above:

• 1.What procedures has the Commission put in place to ensure a conclusive and transparent evaluation of the QLab report, taking into account all scientific evidence and the opinions of EFSA, the JRC and ECHA?
• 2.How will it comply with both the precautionary principle and the principle of proportionality, avoiding any restrictive measures that are not backed up by rigorous scientific data?
• 3.Has it considered requesting independent technical advice from entities with proven expertise in the field, such as QuoData GmbH, in order to ensure optimum scientific quality and reliability in regulatory decisions?

Submitted: 22.5.2025

Question for written answer  E-001941/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

State actors are exploiting migrants to artificially create migratory pressure as a tool to achieve political goals and for destabilisation. Migratory pressure has been used in this way at the EU’s external borders in Greece and Spain. However, it is the EU’s eastern border that has borne the brunt of this phenomenon; Moscow and Minsk have been instrumentalising migrants – with no regard for the humanitarian cost – in order to achieve geopolitical goals. While Poland, the Baltic States and Finland have been decisive in their response to this situation, the EU’s response has been, and continues to be, delayed and inadequate considering the scale of the threat.

I am certain that Regulation (EU) 2024/1359[1], adopted a year ago, as well as the amendments to Regulation (EU) 2016/399 that are already in force[2] and the communication published in December 2024[3] will do little to discourage Minsk and Moscow from continuing to engage in this kind of hybrid warfare. This is evidenced not least by the agreement Belarus has signed with Pakistan[4], as well as the latest wave of attacks on the Polish Border Guard[5]. Against this backdrop, it is concerning that, in February, the Commission’s 2025 work programme announced the withdrawal of its proposal for Regulation 2021/0427(COD) on addressing situations of instrumentalisation[6]. As a Parliament rapporteur, my view is that the original draft was outdated and failed to meet expectations. No comprehensive alternative was provided for the withdrawn draft. It is particularly worrying that the instrumentalisation of migration was omitted from the proposal for Directive 2023/0439(COD)[7], as recognised by the Council[8].

• 1.Has the Commission consulted the countries that have been the target of instrumentalised migration, and does it consider the legal framework for countering this phenomenon to be adequate?
• 2.Why has the Commission omitted the issue of instrumentalisation from the proposal for Directive 2023/0439(COD)?

Submitted: 14.5.2025

• [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1359/oj/eng
• [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/399/oj/eng
• [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0570
• [4] https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka-belarus-pakistan-migrants-eu/33382244.html
• [5] https://wpolityce.pl/kraj/726559-atak-migrantow-na-straz-graniczna-wsrod-nich-bialorusin
• [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0890
• [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2023_439
• [8] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15916-2024-REV-1/en/pdf

Question for written answer  E-001964/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Auke Zijlstra (PfE), Marieke Ehlers (PfE)

On 15 May 2025, Politico published the article ‘EU asylum agency bosses favored “friendly circle” for promotions, watchdog finds’[1]. It reports that OLAF has found, following investigations, that the EU Agency for Asylum has been promoting a ‘friendly circle’ into senior positions. The stability and reputation of the agency is reported to be at stake. On 7 May 2025, a majority decision was taken in Strasbourg not to grant discharge to the Agency for Asylum[2]. The reasons behind this were urgent concerns about the ‘internal management’ and ‘procedures of the agency’, nepotism and issues affecting its financial management. The executive director of the Agency for Asylum refused to give answers to the CONT Committee and its board refused to make any further comments on the OLAF report[3].

• 1.Does the Commission share our view that this is an extremely worrying situation that requires decisive action on the part of the Agency for Asylum?
• 2.Does the Commission consider the positions of the director and the members of the management board to be tenable?
• 3.On the basis of the recent OLAF report, what concrete measures does the Commission intend to take?

Submitted: 15.5.2025

• [1] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-asylum-agency-bosses-promotions-watchdog-probe/.
• [2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/PV-10-2025-05-07-RCV_EN.html (point 3).
• [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2025-0065_EN.html (paragraphs 94-96).