Answer to a written question – Implementation of Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rulings – E-000922/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The Commission will continue to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the correct application of EU free movement law, including addressing specific difficulties preventing LGBTIQ people and their families from enjoying their rights. In each specific case, the Commission makes use of the tools considered most effective for ensuring the protection of rights.

The Commission has been raising awareness about the Coman judgment[1] (C-673/16) since its delivery by the Court, and has been monitoring its implementation in all Member States, in particular through discussions in dedicated fora.

The Commission is in contact with Romania regarding its application of EU free movement law. While the impact of the provisions of national law under discussion may be greater for rainbow families, they have a broader scope and must be addressed in their entirety.

The Commission understands that a draft legislation relevant to these discussions is currently under discussion in the Romanian Parliament, and will continue to closely monitor the developments.

The Commission is also closely monitoring the implementation of the Mirin judgment[2] ( C-4/23) , delivered on 4 October 2024. The Commission contacted Romanian authorities in February 2025 inquiring about the measures to be taken in that regard. A reply is still pending.

  • [1] C-673/16, Coman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
  • [2] C-4/23, Mirin, ECLI:EU:C:2024:845.
Last updated: 7 May 2025

Answer to a written question – Fresh protests from European farmers – E-001000/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The Commission is fully aware of the challenges faced by farmers such as the drought conditions in Romania.

To address these challenges, the Vision for Agriculture and Food presented on 19 February 2025[1] contains an ambitious roadmap and different work streams towards an agri-food system that is attractive, competitive, sustainable and fair for current and future generations, including trade and simplification.

Trade agreements, like the EU-MERCOSUR Partnership Agreement, strike a balance between both the EU offensive and defensive interests of the agri-food sector.

Trade agreements open new export opportunities for the EU agri-food sector, to the benefit of EU farmers income. At the same time the EU agri-food sector relies on imports from third countries.

Moreover, imported products need to fully comply with EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards (SPS). These standards include the ban of hormones in cattle raising in both domestic and imported products.

The current autonomous trade measures[2] for Ukraine include strengthened safeguards setting caps on imports of certain agricultural products from Ukraine. They helped stabilising markets and provide stability and predictability for farmers on both sides.

Meanwhile, the Commission continues its efforts to simplify the delivery of the current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in view of reducing the administrative burden and providing more flexibility to farmers and national administrations. The second simplification package of the current CAP is expected for the second quarter of 2025.

  • [1]  https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/vision-agriculture-food_en#:~:text=Shaping%20the%20future%20of%20farming%20and%20the%20agri-food,entire%20value%20chain%20within%20the%20EU%20and%20globally
  • [2]  Regulation (EU) 2024/1392 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on temporary trade-liberalisation measures supplementing trade concessions applicable to Ukrainian products under the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj).
Last updated: 7 May 2025

Answer to a written question – EU Cohesion Policy – P-001314/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

1. As underlined in the recent Commission’s communication on ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’[1] (MFF), it is imperative that the next EU budget plays a central role in promoting the EU’s sustainable prosperity and bolstering economic, social and territorial cohesion.

2. In line with the political guidelines of the President of the Commission[2] and the above-mentioned communication, the future EU budget will include a strengthened cohesion and growth policy with regions at the centre. At the core of the modernised EU budget should be a plan for each country with key reforms and investments, and focusing on joint priorities, including promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion, which will be designed and implemented in partnership with national, regional and local authorities. Delivering on EU priorities must be done together — with Member States and their regions shaping many of the EU investments on the ground, and the EU budget supporting and incentivising their action. Cohesion policy will continue to support all regions, with particular attention to the less developed ones.

3. The Commission is currently engaging with the EU institutions, including the European Parliament, Member States and stakeholders to help prepare the proposal for the next MFF, which it intends to present in July 2025.

  • [1]  https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6d47acb4-9206-4d0f-8f9b-3b10cad7b1ed_en?filename=Communication%20on%20the%20road%20to%20the%20next%20MFF_en.pdf
  • [2]  https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en
Last updated: 7 May 2025

Answer to a written question – Bureaucratic barriers and delays in the development of energy communities in Italy – E-001222/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

Directive (EU) 2018/2001[1] (RED II) and Directive (EU) 2024/1711[2] amending Directive (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design create a comprehensive legal framework for renewables self-consumption, energy sharing and energy communities.

Member States had until 30 June 2021 to transpose RED II into their national legislations. The deadline to transpose the relevant provisions on energy sharing of Directive (EU) 2024/1711, which give final customers engaged in energy sharing the right to have the shared electricity deducted from their total consumption to reduce the customer’s bill, is 17 July 2026.

The infringement proceeding against Italy for partial transposition of RED II (INFR(2021)0266) w as closed in February 2025[3]. The conformity of the transposition will be investigated in a second phase.

In addition, Directive (EU) 2023/2413 amending RED II[4] introduced shorter deadlines for the permit-granting procedure of renewable energy projects, which do also apply to renewables self-consumers and renewable energy communities. Member States had until 1 July 2024 to transpose these rules.

The Commission is currently checking whether the provisions of the directive have been fully transposed and has opened infringement proceedings against a number of Member States, including Italy[5], for failing to transpose into national law the EU permit-granting procedures rules from the directive (EU) 2023/2413. The conformity of the transposition will be investigated in a second phase.

The Commission is working with Member States through e.g. the Concerted Action on the RED to ensure that the provisions are completely and correctly transposed and facilitate self-consumption and renewable energy communities.

  • [1] Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 82-209.
  • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design, OJ L, 2024/1711, 26.6.2024.
  • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/infringement_decisions/?lang_code=en&langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2021)0266
  • [4] Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (OJ L, 2023/24, 31.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj).
  • [5] INFR(2024)0232), September infringement package (https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/september-infringement-package-key-decisions-energy-2024-09-26_en) and February infringement package (https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/february-infringement-package-key-decisions-energy-2025-02-12_en).
Last updated: 7 May 2025

Answer to a written question – Possible violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union by the Italian Highway Code – E-000726/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

Under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, non-discrimination is a core principle. However, for the Charter to be applicable, the measure in question must involve the implementation of EU law[1].

In general, traffic rules remain primarily a matter of national competence, and the situation described involves a national rule, specifically Article 122(2) of the current Italian Highway Code[2].

Accompanied driving schemes usually involve drivers below the standard minimum age for a certain driving licence category who are accompanied by an experienced driver.

Article 4(6)(d) of Directive 2006/126/EC[3] grants Member States the discretion to lower the minimum age for certain driving privileges, however without requiring an accompanied driving scheme.

As there are currently no EU rules on accompanied driving schemes, the national rule in question does not implement EU law and hence the Charter does not apply.

It is the responsibility of national authorities and courts to ensure that national measures adhere to fundamental rights, potentially under Italian law or the Italian Constitution.

That said, things will change in the future. During the recent negotiations on the upcoming fourth Driving Licence Directive, the co-legislators endorsed the Commission’s proposal to mandate an EU-wide accompanied driving scheme for Category B.

However, they chose not to extend this obligation to Category C, leaving the implementation of the scheme optional for both Categories C and C1.

The planned introduction of accompanied driving is expected to promote greater harmonisation across Member States in the future.

  • [1] Art. 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
  • [2] Law Decree 121/2021, as amended by Law 177/2024.
  • [3] OJ L 403, 30.12.2006, p. 18.

Written question – Israeli settlement products: alignment of EU policies with UN resolution – P-001801/2025

Source: European Parliament

Priority question for written answer  P-001801/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE)

On 15 January 2025, in a written response, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič stated that the ‘EU positions and policies are fully aligned’ with the UN General Assembly resolution of 13 September 2024[1].

However, this resolution, recalling the conclusions of the 19 July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), calls on all states ‘to take steps towards ceasing the importation of any products originating in the Israeli settlements’.

  • 1.In light of the UN resolution and the ICJ advisory opinion, does the Commission consider that the EU’s differentiation policy – which merely renders Israeli settlement products ineligible for trade preferences under the EU-Israel Association Agreement – is aligned with paragraph 5(b) of said resolution and paragraph 278 of the aforementioned advisory opinion? And if so, on what basis?
  • 2.Does the Commission consider that Member States are violating international law by continuing to allow the trade of Israeli settlement products within the EU market?
  • 3.How does the Commission plan to move forward with the ban on Israeli settlement products?

Submitted: 5.5.2025

  • [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-002150-ASW_EN.html
Last updated: 7 May 2025

Answer to a written question – The EU’s digital transformation programmes and the European funds that have been disbursed to achieve it – E-001032/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The Digital Europe Programme (DEP), the first programme entirely dedicated to the deployment of digital infrastructures and an important enabler of the European digital transition, has an overall budget of EUR 8.1 billion for funding activities in six areas: supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, advanced digital skills, ensuring the wide use of digital technologies across the economy and society and semiconductors.

Due to the 50% funding rate of the programme, the same amount is being invested by Member States and beneficiaries from the programme.

2024 saw the signature of the 500th grant under DEP. This milestone represents an overall investment of EUR 3.3 billion, with EUR 1.9 billion contributed from the DEP budget. Over EUR 1 billion has been invested in over 140 procurements and in contribution agreements.

Through InvestEU, EUR 83.63 million have been committed to support strategic digital technologies and EUR 67 million for investments in semiconductor technologies that are expected to mobilise EUR 2.1 billion.

The implementation of DEP is on track to achieve its objectives. A number of big initiatives have been launched: deployment of world-class supercomputers and artificial intelligence factories, launch of leading semiconductor pilot lines, European Digital Identity ( eID) pilot projects, The European Quantum Communication Infrastructure Initiative (EuroQCI), security operation centres, Destination Earth, the European Virtual Human Twins Initiative, and the network of Digital Innovation Hubs in all Member States.

These flagship initiatives for the EU are now well recognised by the Member States and stakeholders alike, paving the way for European digital transition.

Detailed data on the implementation of DEP, including financial data, can be found in the DIGITAL dashboard[1].

  • [1] https://dashboard.tech.ec.europa.eu/qs_digit_dashboard_mt/public/extensions/CNECT_DIGITAL_dashboard/CNECT_DIGITAL_dashboard.html

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on violations of religious freedom in Tibet – RC-B10-0248/2025

Source: European Parliament

pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
replacing the following motions:
B10‑0248/2025 (Verts/ALE)
B10‑0251/2025 (S&D)
B10‑0254/2025 (Renew)
B10‑0256/2025 (PPE)
B10‑0259/2025 (ECR)

Sebastião Bugalho, Danuše Nerudová, Michael Gahler, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Tomas Tobé, Reinhold Lopatka, Liudas Mažylis, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Mirosława Nykiel, Wouter Beke, Luděk Niedermayer, Vangelis Meimarakis, Milan Zver, Tomáš Zdechovský, Miriam Lexmann, Ondřej Kolář, Jan Farský, Loránt Vincze, Jessica Polfjärd, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
on behalf of the PPE Group
Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Hannes Heide
on behalf of the S&D Group
Adam Bielan, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Assita Kanko, Maciej Wąsik, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Alexandr Vondra, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Michał Dworczyk, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Carlo Fidanza
on behalf of the ECR Group
Engin Eroglu, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ľubica Karvašová, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group
Ville Niinistö
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

European Parliament resolution on violations of religious freedom in Tibet

(2025/2692(RSP))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to its previous resolutions on Tibet and China,

 having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the Chinese authorities have become increasingly oppressive; whereas the human rights situation in Tibet continues to deteriorate; whereas respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law should be at the centre of the EU’s relations with China;

B. whereas Tulku Hungkar Dorje, a respected Tibetan Buddhist religious leader and humanitarian figure, died on 28 March 2025 under suspicious circumstances while in custody in Vietnam, following his arrest by Vietnamese and Chinese authorities; whereas his body was reportedly cremated without the consent of his family, raising serious concerns;

C. whereas Tibetan Buddhists, who are systemically targeted by Chinese authorities and face forced disappearances and physical abuse, represent the largest religious group among political prisoners in China;

D. whereas credible reports identify extensive pressure from Chinese authorities on Rinpoches to align with the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative, including forced interrogations and attempts to enforce support for the Chinese-appointed Panchen Lama;

1. Strongly condemns the repressive assimilation policies throughout PRC and their violations of universal human rights, especially in Tibet, which seek to eliminate distinct Tibetan religious and cultural traditions and heritage; calls for a clear separation between State and religion in China;

2. Firmly opposes any attempt by the Chinese Government to interfere in the selection of Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, including the Dalai Lama;

3. Expresses its deep concern and sorrow over the suspicious death of Tulku Hungkar Dorje and extends its sincere condolences to his family, monastery and followers;

4. Strongly condemns the continued persecution of Tibetan religious and cultural leaders and the practice of transnational repression by Chinese authorities, including the cultural and linguistic assimilation of children in state-run residential schools, reflecting a broader policy of forced assimilation; calls for the suspension of extradition treaties with the PRC;

5. Calls for an immediate, independent, impartial and transparent investigation into his death, with international oversight and access to evidence and witnesses, and the immediate return of his remains;

6. Demands that those responsible for wrongdoing be held accountable under international human rights standards and law; demands that the EU impose sanctions on officials and entities responsible for human rights violations in Tibet;

7. Urges the PRC to uphold its obligations under international law and cease all discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, allow peaceful religious practice, and release all religious and political prisoners, including the rightful Panchen Lama and Ilham Tohti;

8. Urges the EU and Member States to raise this case in bilateral and multilateral dialogues with PRC and Vietnam, and demand accountability for human rights violations in Tibet; insists on also raising the repression of other religious minorities such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the EUSR, the governments of PRC and Vietnam, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Central Tibetan Administration.

 

 

Briefing – Territorial supply constraints: An unaddressed barrier to single market integration – 07-05-2025

Source: European Parliament

Territorial supply constraints (TSCs) still constitute a barrier to the single market. TSCs are restrictions on the supply of goods that are linked to the territories in which sales are made at different levels in the supply chain. A study delivered for the European Commission in 2020 estimated that eliminating TSCs could lead to consumer savings of around €14 billion. In the absence of specific rules, this problem has been tackled at EU level by competition law, but with only partial success. Competition law is constrained by certain parameters, notably the requirement for agreements to exist between contracting parties or for one of the parties involved to have a dominant position on the market, which means that it is not suitable to tackle all instances of TSCs. The same phenomenon has been visible in the past in similar policy areas. For example, unfair trading practices in the food sector were also addressed, with partial success, by competition law, before specific legislation was adopted. To meet recent calls for action on TSCs, the same progression – from partial regulation through competition law to full internal market legislation – may be required.

At a Glance – Disappearance of migrant children in the EU – 07-05-2025

Source: European Parliament

Between 2021 and 2023, at least 51 433 unaccompanied minors were reported as missing across Europe, averaging nearly 47 children a day. Over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing across Europe between 2018 and 2020. It is feared that many of these children may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address this issue.