MIL European Union Publishing Engine
Source: European Parliament
The Committee on Regional Development will vote on the Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review COM(2025)123 final – 2025/0084 (COD). This is an urgent procedure under Rule 170(5) of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure.
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001586/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)
Türkiye has been funded mainly through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). From 2002-2022, Türkiye received more than €9 billion, with the objectives of ‘supporting political reforms, strengthening civil society, protecting the environment and promoting regional development and the rule of law’.
During the first IPA programming period (2007–2013), Türkiye received around €4.8 billion. In the second phase (2014–2020), €4.5 billion was approved, but part of this was ‘frozen’ due to events following the ‘2016 coup’. From 2021 onwards, funding continued under supposedly stricter conditions and supposedly increased oversight.
The EU has also provided funding for ‘humanitarian programmes for Syrian refugees in Türkiye, through the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’, amounting to over €6 billion since 2016 to date.
In total, Türkiye has received over €18 billion from the EU through these two main mechanisms. In addition, the European Investment Bank has provided Türkiye with loans of €29.3 billion for 278 projects from 1987 to 2018, further strengthening the EU’s financial support to the country.
Can the Commission, in terms of the value of the euro today, calculate the total amount of grants, technical assistance and soft loans to Türkiye?
Submitted: 21.4.2025
Source: European Parliament
The Commission would like to kindly refer the Honourable Member to the publicly available Financial Transparency System (FTS)[1].
In accordance with Article 38 of the Financial Regulation[2], on the FTS portal, the Commission makes available information of grant recipients of funds financed from the budget . The information concerning financial year 2024 will be published in June 2025.
The Commission implements EU funding fully in line with the relevant EU legislation adopted by the EU legislator, in particular the Financial Regulation, which sets out the relevant provisions to ensure that the financial interests of the Union budget are protected.
For example, the Financial Regulation sets out specific rules to ensure that procurement and grant funding from the EU budget respect equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001643/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Fabrice Leggeri (PfE), André Rougé (PfE), Julien Leonardelli (PfE), Pierre Pimpie (PfE), Tom Vandendriessche (PfE), Marieke Ehlers (PfE), Petra Steger (PfE), Jorge Buxadé Villalba (PfE), Kinga Gál (PfE), András László (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Marie Dauchy (PfE), Matthieu Valet (PfE), Gilles Pennelle (PfE), Mélanie Disdier (PfE)
On 15 April 2025, the Commission launched a call for evidence[1] to contribute to the development of the ‘2026-2030 EU anti-racism strategy’.
The strategy was announced by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen and follows on from the ‘EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025’[2], which aimed to combat ‘structural racism’. Despite this plan, the Commission believes that ‘more effective protection from racial discrimination and the systematic prevention of racism against all racialised groups[3] is needed’.
The Commission, entirely driven by woke ideology, plans to rely on controversial reports by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights entitled ‘Being Black in the EU[4]’ and ‘Being Muslim in the EU[5]’.
Having initially called for a fight against racism ‘in all its forms’, which would be reasonable, Brussels finally hurried to clarify exactly which forms: ‘anti-Black racism, anti-Asian racism, anti-Muslim racism…’, then states that it will ‘adopt an intersectional approach’.
Meanwhile, there is no mention of anti-white racism or Christianophobia.
Supporter[6]
Submitted: 23.4.2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001677/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Pina Picierno (S&D)
Vladimir Solovyev, a well-known Russian journalist and television presenter considered one of the Kremlin’s leading propagandists, was added to the European Union’s sanctions list on 23 February 2022. His assets were frozen and he was banned from entering Member States, including Italy, where his properties worth EUR 8 million were seized.
In March 2025, his planned appearance on the programme ‘Lo Stato delle cose’ on Italian state television (Rai 3) was cancelled following a report.
The Italian platform Byoblu, which has always been aligned with Russian narrative, continues to play a key role in spreading Kremlin propaganda, supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine and promoting narratives hostile to the EU and its democratic values, including attacks such as that by spokesperson Zakharova against President Mattarella. On 24 April 2025, that platform announced a new invitation to Solovyev.
In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:
Submitted: 25.4.2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001675/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Gerald Hauser (PfE)
Scientific publications document cases of liver damage following vaccination against COVID-19, including immune-mediated hepatitis, acute liver cell injury and liver impairment in transplant patients. Here are a few examples:
– Liver injury following SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: A multicenter case series[1]
– Liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: Features of immune-mediated hepatitis, role of corticosteroid therapy and outcome[2]
– Histological and serological features of acute liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination[3]
– Risk of acute liver injury following the mRNA (BNT162b2) and inactivated (CoronaVac) COVID-19 vaccines[4]
– Severe de novo liver injury after Moderna vaccination – not always autoimmune hepatitis[5]
Not only can liver damage be caused by mRNA vaccination, but the vaccines also have a wide range of other side effects.
Submitted: 25.4.2025
Source: European Parliament
The European Accessibility Act is a directive with legal base Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under this legal base, the legislator can adopt measures for the approximation of laws in the Member States, with the objective of the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
The related Impact Assessment clarified that there was no national legislation on accessibility of domestic appliances. Hence no barriers in the market due to divergent legislation were identified, with domestic appliances falling outside the scope of the Commission proposal.
Nevertheless, the Commission supports the accessibility of user interfaces including by the development of accessibility standards, such as those under standardisation request M587 regarding the accessibility requirements of products and services in support of the European Accessibility Act[1]. These could help manufacturers of domestic appliances to address accessibility of their products.
In addition, through the AccessibleEU centre, the Commission supports capacity building and training on accessibility including for manufacturing industries.
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001623/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Cecilia Strada (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)
At the end of March 2025, a bill amending the Polish Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners entered into force. The new provisions allow the temporary suspension of the right to apply for asylum for migrants entering Poland via its border with Belarus. This bill could pave the way to violations of the non-refoulement principle, as clearly stated by the UNHCR[1] and the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights[2]. It is not the first time that Poland has tried to give legal ground to pushback practices[3].
These provisions could come into force against a backdrop of a recurring use of pushback practices at the Poland-Belarus border, as reported by several NGOs and researchers[4], and while Poland stands accused of refoulements before the European Court of Human Rights[5].
Considering that the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions are binding and unavoidable for Poland:
Submitted: 23.4.2025
Source: European Parliament
In accordance with the Treaties, it is a prerogative of the Member States to determine the volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work[1]. The Commission cannot determine how many third-country nationals may enter and legally reside in Europe.
In 2023, Member States issued more than 3,7 million residence permits to non-EU citizens from more than 170 countries[2]. Other than residence permits issued for work (33%) and education (14%), the rest of the permits was granted for family reasons (26%) and other reasons (26%), including international protection[3].
The Commission has no information about the profiles of the persons who have obtained residency permits for education in the Member States.
Member States are not required to provide information to the Commission about the profiles of international students, what type of university education they have received in their countries of origin, and what level of degree they aim to obtain in the EU.
Source: European Parliament
The regulation on the establishment of the European Digital Identity (EUDI) Framework[1] mandates Member States to offer digital identity wallets. It provides the possibility for effective age verification (AV) within the EU.
To bridge the gap until the EUDI wallets become available, the Commission is developing a privacy preserving, data minimising, harmonised AV solution.
Under Article 28(1) of the Digital Services Act (DSA)[2], all providers of online platforms accessible to minors must ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security to minors on their services.
Those providers of online platforms accessible to minors, including app stores (i.e. Google Play), must implement appropriate and proportionate measures to fulfil such obligations.
Independently from app stores’ obligations, some app developers distributing their apps on app stores (i.e. TikTok) also fall under the scope of Article 28(1) of the DSA. To comply with that provision, providers of online platforms accessible to minors may have to implement AV, based on their risk profile[3].
Providers of app stores designated as very large online platforms are required, under Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA, to identify, analyse and assess the systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of their services, considering inter alia any actual of foreseeable negative effect for the respect of the rights of the child enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU[4], and put in place effective mitigation measures to address such risks.