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Question for written answer  E-001677/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Pina Picierno (S&D)

Vladimir Solovyev, a well-known Russian journalist and television presenter considered one of the Kremlin’s leading propagandists, was added to the European Union’s sanctions list on 23 February 2022. His assets were frozen and he was banned from entering Member States, including Italy, where his properties worth EUR 8 million were seized.

In March 2025, his planned appearance on the programme ‘Lo Stato delle cose’ on Italian state television (Rai 3) was cancelled following a report.

The Italian platform Byoblu, which has always been aligned with Russian narrative, continues to play a key role in spreading Kremlin propaganda, supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine and promoting narratives hostile to the EU and its democratic values, including attacks such as that by spokesperson Zakharova against President Mattarella. On 24 April 2025, that platform announced a new invitation to Solovyev.

In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

• 1.Is the Commission aware of the practice of two Italian media outlets issuing invitations to Solovyev, in breach of EU sanctions?
• 2.What measures does it intend to take to ensure compliance and combat pro-Russian disinformation in the Union?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001675/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Gerald Hauser (PfE)

Scientific publications document cases of liver damage following vaccination against COVID-19, including immune-mediated hepatitis, acute liver cell injury and liver impairment in transplant patients. Here are a few examples:

– Liver injury following SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: A multicenter case series[1]

– Liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination: Features of immune-mediated hepatitis, role of corticosteroid therapy and outcome[2]

– Histological and serological features of acute liver injury after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination[3]

– Risk of acute liver injury following the mRNA (BNT162b2) and inactivated (CoronaVac) COVID-19 vaccines[4]

– Severe de novo liver injury after Moderna vaccination – not always autoimmune hepatitis[5]

Not only can liver damage be caused by mRNA vaccination, but the vaccines also have a wide range of other side effects.

• 1.In hindsight, what does the Commission make of the scientific diligence shown in authorising the mRNA vaccines in view of the wide range of side effects they have?
• 2.Are any investigations currently being carried out by the Commission or subordinate EU authorities into the safety of mRNA vaccines?
• 3.Were potential hepatotoxicity, genotoxicity, cardiotoxic effects, immunotoxicity, neurotoxic effects and possible long-term effects on liver function and genetic integrity investigated when the mRNA vaccines were authorised?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

• [1] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34339763/
• [2] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35567545/
• [3] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36440259/
• [4] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35817224/
• [5] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35439566/

The European Accessibility Act is a directive with legal base Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Under this legal base, the legislator can adopt measures for the approximation of laws in the Member States, with the objective of the establishment and functioning of the internal market.

The related Impact Assessment clarified that there was no national legislation on accessibility of domestic appliances. Hence no barriers in the market due to divergent legislation were identified, with domestic appliances falling outside the scope of the Commission proposal.

Nevertheless, the Commission supports the accessibility of user interfaces including by the development of accessibility standards, such as those under standardisation request M587 regarding the accessibility requirements of products and services in support of the European Accessibility Act[1]. These could help manufacturers of domestic appliances to address accessibility of their products.

In addition, through the AccessibleEU centre, the Commission supports capacity building and training on accessibility including for manufacturing industries.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/enorm/mandate/587_en

Question for written answer  E-001623/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Cecilia Strada (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

At the end of March 2025, a bill amending the Polish Act on Granting Protection to Foreigners entered into force. The new provisions allow the temporary suspension of the right to apply for asylum for migrants entering Poland via its border with Belarus. This bill could pave the way to violations of the non-refoulement principle, as clearly stated by the UNHCR[1] and the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights[2]. It is not the first time that Poland has tried to give legal ground to pushback practices[3].

These provisions could come into force against a backdrop of a recurring use of pushback practices at the Poland-Belarus border, as reported by several NGOs and researchers[4], and while Poland stands accused of refoulements before the European Court of Human Rights[5].

Considering that the non-refoulement principle and the prohibition of collective expulsions are binding and unavoidable for Poland:

• 1.Can the Commission assess the situation on the Poland-Belarus border, notably in relation to the latest report on pushback practices[6]?
• 2.Which initiatives does the Commission intend to pursue in order to ensure that Poland abides by Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture?

Submitted: 23.4.2025

• [1] https://www.refworld.org/legal/natlegcomments/unhcr/2024/en/149257
• [2] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/en/content/chr-draft-amendment-act-granting-protection-foreigners-territory-republic-poland-opinion
• [3] G. Baranowska, Pushbacks in Poland: grounding the practice in domestic law in 2021, Polish Yearbook of International Law.
• [4] Inter alia: C. Greener, D. Ozynska, Brutal Barriers. Pushbacks, violence and the violation of human rights on the Poland-Belarus border; Pushed, beaten, left to die. European pushback report 2024; Human Rights Watch, Poland: brutal pushbacks at the Belarus border, 10 December 2024.
• [5] R.A. and Others v. Poland (no. 42120/21), European court of Human Rights.
• [6] C. Greener, D. Ozynska, Brutal Barriers. Pushbacks, violence and the violation of human rights on the Poland-Belarus border.

In accordance with the Treaties, it is a prerogative of the Member States to determine the volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work[1]. The Commission cannot determine how many third-country nationals may enter and legally reside in Europe.

In 2023, Member States issued more than 3,7 million residence permits to non-EU citizens from more than 170 countries[2]. Other than residence permits issued for work (33%) and education (14%), the rest of the permits was granted for family reasons (26%) and other reasons (26%), including international protection[3].

The Commission has no information about the profiles of the persons who have obtained residency permits for education in the Member States.

Member States are not required to provide information to the Commission about the profiles of international students, what type of university education they have received in their countries of origin, and what level of degree they aim to obtain in the EU.

• [1] See Article 79(5) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
• [2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resfirst/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=66195d4d-e3d8-444d-956b-55e8faca4038
• [3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Residence_permits_-_statistics_on_first_permits_issued_during_the_year

The regulation on the establishment of the European Digital Identity (EUDI) Framework[1] mandates Member States to offer digital identity wallets. It provides the possibility for effective age verification (AV) within the EU.

To bridge the gap until the EUDI wallets become available, the Commission is developing a privacy preserving, data minimising, harmonised AV solution.

Under Article 28(1) of the Digital Services Act (DSA)[2], all providers of online platforms accessible to minors must ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security to minors on their services.

Those providers of online platforms accessible to minors, including app stores (i.e. Google Play), must implement appropriate and proportionate measures to fulfil such obligations.

Independently from app stores’ obligations, some app developers distributing their apps on app stores (i.e. TikTok) also fall under the scope of Article 28(1) of the DSA. To comply with that provision, providers of online platforms accessible to minors may have to implement AV, based on their risk profile[3].

Providers of app stores designated as very large online platforms are required, under Articles 34 and 35 of the DSA, to identify, analyse and assess the systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of their services, considering inter alia any actual of foreseeable negative effect for the respect of the rights of the child enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU[4], and put in place effective mitigation measures to address such risks.

• [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework (OJ L, 2024/1183, 30.4.2024).
• [2] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022).
• [3] The Commission will set out in Guidelines in which scenarios it would expect online platforms to implement age verification or age assurance in order to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security.
• [4] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012).

Priority question for written answer  P-001695/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Friedrich Pürner (NI)

A recently published investigation by a German newspaper[1] has revealed that the European Medicines Agency (EMA) omitted or avoided crucial checks to test for side effects during the approval procedures for COVID-19 vaccines. Statutory good clinical practice checks by inspectors to review manufacturers’ clinical studies either did not take place or were limited in scope.

• 1.Was the Commission aware of what happened? If so, when did it become aware and why did it not intervene?
• 2.What inspection rules are in place for emergency use authorisation – particularly with regard to studies in non-EU countries – to make sure medicines are safe, the duty of care is upheld and patients are protected?
• 3.Was the Commission informed by the EMA about occurrences of myocarditis (inflammation of the cardiac muscle) in Israel? If so, when (what date) and by whom (names of those involved), and how did the Commission handle this information on safety signals after mRNA vaccines were administered?

Submitted: 28.4.2025

• [1] https://www.welt.de/politik/plus256010158/Impfstoff-Kontrollen-Das-war-politisch-nicht-gewuenscht.html

The Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF) supports 103 investments and 76 reforms in Greece as set out in a national plan (Greece 2.0) submitted by the Greek authorities to the Commission.

Disbursement of funds is based on satisfactory fulfilment of related milestones and targets following an assessment carried out by the Commission[2].

This assessment concerns the fulfilment of the requirements set out in the Council Implementing Decision[3] and verification is based on related evidence submitted by the Greek authorities (e.g. adoption of a law).

So far, 51% of RRF funds has been disbursed to Greece, and following the recent endorsement by the Commission of the fifth payment request for EUR 3.1 billion, total disbursements to the country will reach 59% in the next months.

The Greek authorities have adopted measures to facilitate the smooth implementation of the plan and boost administrative capacity, including through the establishment of a dedicated agency (EYSTA) that is part of the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance.

In the Council’s country-specific recommendations to Greece of July 2024[4], Greece is further recommended to strengthen administrative capacity to manage EU funds, including RRF funds, accelerate investments, and maintain momentum in the implementation of reforms.

Greece is notably recommended to address challenges related to: (i) lengthy litigation processes in public procurement procedures that risk causing delays in investments; (ii) slow transfer of property rights; and (iii) weak coordination among Ministries.

• [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en
• [2] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en
• [3] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/803810c9-c307-412e-8e9e-238ae6e76734_en?filename=COM_2024_591_1_EN_annexe_proposition_cp_part1_v4.pdf
• [4] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/96abbf09-3934-40a6-b234-f60c93928a87_en?filename=com_2024_608_1_en.pdf