MIL Publishing Engine 1

MediaInvest[1], a part of the InvestEU[2] programme, is a dedicated equity investment vehicle aimed at stimulating private investment in the audiovisual and gaming sectors. It is implemented by the European Investment Fund[3] (EIF) on behalf of the Commission.

To date, the EIF has signed four deals under MediaInvest ( Logical Content Ventures (France), focusing on content production; Behold Ventures (Sweden) focusing on video games sector; IPR.VC (Finland) focusing on European films and TV series; Together S.L.P (France), focusing on audiovisual small and medium enterprises).

The EIF publishes once a year on its website a list of (i) financial intermediaries[4] being supported via InvestEU, including MediaInvest; and (ii) final beneficiaries[5] that have received financial support via InvestEU for an amount of at least EUR 500 000.

As announced in the communication ‘The Road to the next multiannual financial framework’[6], the Commission intends to present its proposal for the next multiannual financial framework in July 2025.

InvestEU aim at ensuring that financial intermediaries commit to invest a minimum amount into EU eligible companies. In addition, MediaInvest requires that a significant percentage of the investments targets audiovisual projects based in the EU.

• [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/mediainvest
• [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4516649
• [3] eif.org/index.htm
• [4] www.eif.org
• [5] https://www.eif.org/InvestEU/equity_products/ieu-equity-visibility-report-final-recipients.pdf
• [6] COM(2025) 46 final.

The general objective for United Nations (UN) resolutions remains to address the overall human rights situation, and in the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to address the systemic, gross and widespread human rights violations.

While the outcome and final text of such resolutions always depends on negotiations in Geneva and New York with the wider UN membership, it remains the EU’s policy to maintain the emphasis on the overall human rights situation, including recent developments and systemic violations. It does not preclude that on rare occasions, such as the ones referred to by the Honourable Member, there can be exceptions.

The EU calls attention to individual cases in its statements, notably during general debates or interactive dialogues at the UN. In addition, there is also a constraint in the sense that referring to an individual case requires having reliable sources of information.

Due consideration is given to applying the ‘do no harm’ principle, sought through contacts with civil society and representatives of victims and their families.

Following the Honourable Member’s written question (E-002674/2024) and input received from other stakeholders, the EU in 2025 has made a particular effort to strengthen the UN Human Rights Council resolution on the situation of human rights in the DPRK with additional language on the topic of arbitrary detention of foreigners in the DPRK.

Negotiations on the EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) were concluded in July 2024[1]. When ratified, the DTA w ill complement the existing EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA)[2] that was concluded at a time when the EU had not yet developed a modern digital trade chapter for its FTAs.

The DTA contains state-of-the-art digital trade rules and builds on the EU-Singapore Digital Partnership[3], which focuses on regulatory cooperation on digital policies, including artificial intelligence (AI).

The DTA’s rules on the protection of software source code follow the EU’s approach that carefully balances, on the one hand, the need to uphold EU’s competitiveness by ensuring protection against forced technology transfers by means of mandating source code disclosure as a condition for market access, and, on the other hand, the need to ensure space for legitimate and effective regulatory oversight, in line with EU’s competition and digital acquis.

These rules focus on eradicating market distortive practices that threaten to erode the EU’s industrial base and that cannot be effectively addressed solely by the rules on the protection of intellectual property.

The Commission considers this approach consistent with EU law, including the AI Act[4]. In this regard, the text agreed with Singapore specifically references the need to ensure safe and trustworthy AI as a legitimate public policy objective, ensuring the possibility for competent authorities to require access to source code where justified and subject to safeguards against unauthorised disclosure.

This includes inter alia requirements to access source code for conformity assessment procedures for AI systems.

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_3983
• [2]  OJ L 294, 14.11.2019; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2019%3A294%3ATOC
• [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eu-singapore-digital-partnership
• [4] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng

Question for written answer  E-001674/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Fredis Beleris (PPE)

The new reality of the tariff war that has broken out is changing the way businesses operate, since it creates major challenges, especially for the developing peripheries of Europe. The industries and crafts that were active in the countryside and on islands constituted the ‘lungs’ of local economies and allowed residents to remain in situ.

The complexity of European rules and deficiencies in infrastructure remain significant difficulties, which prevent entrepreneurship in remote and island areas, leading to the closure of industries in many of them. This has led to the transfer of a large part of the production of many companies to non-EU countries, whether bordering the EU or not, which are naturally outside the regulatory framework. It is telling that many everyday products reach the European market with a ‘European stamp’, without however being produced in the EU, making our continent dependent on non-EU countries and affected by possible trade tariffs.

In view of the above:

• 1.Does the Commission intend to carry out an assessment of the impact of de-industrialisation on the local economy of remote and island regions?
• 2.Does the Commission intend to provide financial incentives for the development of the primary and secondary sectors in areas on the verge of economic and productive decline, and in particular in remote and island regions?
• 3.Does the Commission intend to introduce into European industrial policy the management of the challenges of de-industrialisation of remote and island regions?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

In its communication of 18 February 2021[1], the Commission undertook ‘to explore options for an EU strategy for export credits’.

After a feasibility study[2] of May 2023, produced for the Commission by independent consultants, the Commission started work in three areas: encouraging a whole-of-government approach to external financial tools; exploring a potential EU financial tool to work with export credit agencies (ECAs) in support of EU policy priorities; and promoting sustainability.

In addition, agreement was reached at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2023 to modernise the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (‘the Arrangement’), streamlining the rules so that ECAs can better support competitiveness goals, and incentivising ECAs to scale-up their support for zero and low-emission investments, including rail.

Regarding the Luxembourg Rail Protocol, the premium levels set by ECAs are determined according to the Arrangement. Protocols under the Cape Town Convention (CTC) regarding the recovery of assets in the case of default, can play a role in those procedures, as it does in the case of aircraft.

However, the Luxembourg Rail Protocol of the CTC offers less important practical possibility to recover the value of the asset due to important technical differences between air and rail transport, in particular in relation to interoperability and accessibility .

Furthermore there are currently few contracting parties to the Luxembourg protocol. The Commission will nevertheless follow further developments.

• [1] Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52021DC0066
• [2] Paul Mudde, Henri d’Ambrières, Arnaud Dornel, Federico Bilder, Feasibility study on an EU strategy on export credits, Final report: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4aa03d2a-08cc-11ee-b12e-01aa75ed71a1

Question for written answer  E-001679/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Benoit Cassart (Renew)

Launched in 2021, Global Gateway aims to mobilise up to EUR 300 billion in investments by 2027 to finance sustainable infrastructure, promote human development and strengthen global connectivity, in Africa in particular. The aim is to propose an alternative to the Chinese ‘new silk roads’ model, with a focus on democratic values, transparency and sustainability.

• 1.Can the Commission explain why this strategy is struggling to establish itself as a lever for EU influence in Africa, despite the geographical proximity and pitched ambitions?
• 2.Does this relative ineffectiveness show that the Commission needs to adopt a more economic and partnership-based model of cooperation, to keep pace with the profound changes taking place on the African continent and the international competition?
• 3.What action will it take to remedy the slow implementation of this strategy, its lack of visibility, its limited budget given the ambitions (few new funds) and the growing and skewed competition from powers such as China (fewer conditionalities) and Russia, at a time when the African continent is undergoing a major economic and geopolitical transformation?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

Question for written answer  E-001680/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Benoit Cassart (Renew)

Many African countries yearn to take control of their economic future. The continent is experiencing unprecedented population growth: it will have a population of 2.5 billion by 2050, and an educated, connected and urbanised youth is emerging, in search of economic opportunities and industrialisation.

Dynamic economic hubs – such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Morocco and Egypt – are asserting their desire for internally generated development, focusing on strategic sectors such as renewable energies, the digital sector, agro-industry and services. Africa is therefore seeking reciprocal economic partnerships that integrate investment, technology transfer, innovation and the development of local economies.

• 1.Given the rapid development of Africa’s economies and mounting global competition, can the Commission continue to rely solely on a development aid approach or should it bring about a paradigm shift, establishing genuine economic diplomacy that is more agile, more proactive and better coordinated, based on partnerships of equals with Africa?
• 2.Should the Commission not ensure a greater role for Europe’s private sector – often absent from the major Global Gateway operations – and improve financing and guarantee mechanisms for EU companies willing to invest on the African continent?

Submitted: 25.4.2025

The Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus[1] is designed to gradually phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers through a transitional approach.

This involves measured annual customs duty increases on imports from Russia of such fertilisers over a period of three years, minimising the risk of potential price impacts.

Its entry into force is dependent on the conclusion of the ordinary legislative procedure currently ongoing in the European Parliament and the Council.

If the proposal is adopted in its current form, the Commission expects the measure to result in a gradual and orderly replacement of Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers with alternatives, including domestically produced ones, contributing to fair competition in the EU fertilisers market and supporting a stable, long term role of the EU fertilisers industry in ensuring the EU food security.

For broader background, some fertilisers (potash) from Russia are currently subject to an import quota as part of the sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine[2].

• [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)34&lang=en
• [2] Article 3(i) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250225